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PREGNANCY AND UNEMPLOYMENT:
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS?
Mark R. Brown

OVERVIEW

Unemployment laws vary from state to state, but all follow
the same basic · theme. An involuntary separation from
employment (firing) normally is compensable under the unemployment laws while a voluntary separation (quitting) is
not. Exceptions exist; misconduct and unavailability for work
disqualify even an involuntarily discharged claimant from
receiving benefits. Even a voluntary separation is compensable if the claimant had "good cause" for quitting and
remains willing and able to work.
Pregnancy-related firings are not only suspect under federal 1 and state anti-discrimination laws, but also most, if not
all, state unemployment laws. With the Supreme Court's
decision in Turner v. Department of Employment Security 2
and the adoption of section 3304(12) of the Federal Un-

employment Tax Act (FUTA)3 the following year, it became
clear that states' unemployment laws could not single out
pregnancy for unfavorable treatment. Discriminatory state
laws that proliferated prior to 1975 were ostensibly rendered
ineffective.4 States were left free, however, to treat pregnancy
the same as any other temporary disability. Because one
often is disqualified from benefits during a period of disability, being unavailable to work, unemployment benefits
are likely to be interrupted during or immediately after the
pregnancy-even if the claimant was fired because bf her
pregnancy.
Voluntary pregnancy-related separations are not compensable under the unemployment laws of at least twenty-

1.
Tit le VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S .C. §§ 2000e t o e-17 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993); Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k ) (1988).
2.
423 U.S. 44 (1975).
3.
26 u.s.c. § 3304(12) (1988).
4.
See Mary F. Radford, Wimberly and Beyond: Analyzing the Refusal to
Award Unemployment Compensation to Women Who Terminate Prior Employment
Due to Pregnancy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 532 (1988).

13

University of Michigan Journal of Law &form

14

[SPECIAL

one jurisdictions. Reasons vary, but more often than not the
state's unemployment law specifically requires that good
cause be "attributable to" or "connected with" employment.
Because pregnancy is neither "attributable to" nor "connected
with" employment, benefits are denied regardless of whether
the pregnancy otherwise amounts to good cause. As explained
by the Supreme Court in Wimberly v. Labor and Industrial
Relations Commission of Missouri, 5 excluding pregnancy is
permissible so long as all other non-occupational illnesses
and disabilities are treated similarly.
Of those states not disqualifying pregnancy altogether, only
a handful afford immediate unemployment benefits, and then
only if the claimant's separation was medically necessary.
These states also commonly require that the claimant remain
available for other work-a difficult standard to meet if health
is what caused the separation in the first place. Texas law, for
example, provides that "an individual who is [otherwise]
available to work may not be disqualified for benefits because
the individual left work because of: (1) a medically verified
illness ... ; (2) injury; (3) disability; or (4) pregnancy."6
The most common approach among those states allowing
benefits, followed in about sixteen jurisdictions, provides
unemployment benefits after childbirth when the mother again
makes herself available for employment. In effect, the claimant
is required to take an unpaid disability/maternity leave, with
unemployment benefits being available only if the former job
does not remain open. Missouri, for example, amended its
unemployment insurance law in response to Wimberly so as not
to disqualify a claimant who
presents evidence supported by competent medical proof
that she was forced to leave her work because of pregnancy,
notified her employer of such necessity as soon as practical
under the circumstances, and returned to that employer
and offered her services to that employer as soon as she
was physically able to return to work, as certified by a
licensed and practicing physician, but in no event later
than ninety days after the termination of the pregnancy. 7

5.
6.
7.

479 U.S. 511 (1987).
LAB. CODE ANN. § 207.045(d) (West 1995) (emphasis added).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 288.050 l.(l)(c) (Supp. 1993).
TEXAS
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Of those jurisdictions that do not address pregnancy, do not
explicitly provide for disability leave, and do not require a
connection between good cause and employment, four likely
would hold that disability or illness amounts to good cause
under certain circumstances. Because equal treatment is
mandated by FUTA, unemployment benefits also would need
to be made available for pregnancy in these states. The almost
universal "availability" requirement, however, likely would
postpone unemployment benefits until after childbirth.
In sum, a substantial minority of jurisdictions altogether
deny unemployment benefits for pregnant workers who voluntarily quit. Although an award of benefits is possible in most
jurisdictions, the claimant is required either to be "available"
for other work or to take an unpaid maternity leave. The result
in either situation is that benefits often are available only postpartum.
I. AN INTERNAL CRITIQUE OF THE SYSTEM:
GENDER BIAS AND

FAVORITlSM

Because most employers would rather not pay any unemployment benefits and would like to avoid potential liability
under the anti-discrimination laws, few are willing to admit to
discharging a worker because of her pregnancy. Employers
naturally are encouraged to dissemble and argue either that
the claimant was justifiably discharged or quit. A composite of
factors, including agency favoritism for employers and gender
bias, creates a serious risk that discharged pregnant claimants
will be wrongly denied benefits. Viewed under its own terms,
then, the current unemployment laws modeled on the antidiscrimination principle can fail pregnant workers.
To illustrate, cons'ider the case of Jenny Brown v. Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commission. Jenny worked for her
employer for over two years before becoming pregnant; she was
separated from her employment within four months of becoming pregnant. Jenny claimed that her employer unilaterally
reduced her hours, hired a new employee, transferred her
duties to the new employee, and warned her not to complain
to the EEOC. The employer, meanwhile, argued that Jenny's
reduced hours had nothing to do with her pregnancy and that
Jenny inexplicably quit work one day for no reason. Not-
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withstanding documentation signed by the employer that
Jenny's hours and duties were being transferred to the new
employee "because of [Jenny's] condition," Jenny was found by
an unemployment hearing officer to have voluntarily quit
without good cause.
Two months after this denial of benefits, Jenny, still
pregnant and in need of income, located part-time, temporary
employment through a placement service. Needless to say the
job paid substantially less than Jenny previously earned.
Within weeks o( beginning this part-thne job1 Jenny's appeal
of the hearing officer's decision proved successful; she was
awarded full benefits retroactive to the date of her separation.
Because of her pregnancy, the part-time nature of her current
job, its lower pay and lack of benefits, and the award of une;mployment benefits from the previous job, Jenny did not
return to her part-time employment. Because Jenny was close
to term and her assigned duties were informal, her part-time
employer assumed that she took maternity leave when she
failed to report for work. Only after Jenny's delivery did the
employer learn that she would not return to work, and at this
time the employer reported her as a voluntary quit.
Becm;1se it viewed her separation from her most recent parttime employment as a voluntary quit, the Unemployment
Division again disqualified Jenny from receiving benefits from
her first employer. A different hearing officer found that
Jenny's subsequent employment was "suitable" because prior
to her separation the part-time job 4ad matured into full-time
status. This conclusion itself was based on Jenny's failure to
prov~ that she had not been offered full-time work. The hearing
officer explained her conclusion as a function of the burden of
proof, "as the testimony between claimant and the employer's
office manager on this determinative point is at equipoise, and
because claimant bears the burden of proof she has not overcome."
Jenny's appeal to the l)nemployment Commission was unsuccessful. The Commission concluded that the burden of
persuasion properly was assigned to Jenny as the claimant,
and in any event that Jenny's accepting and later quitting even
part-time work, at a substantially reduced salary, was still
disqualifying. Whether Jenny was under an obljgation to accept
the work in the first instance and whether full-time employment resulted in substantially reduced wages were held irrelevant. Moreover, in resQonse tp the argument that Jenny's
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separation did not occur until after childbirth, when the parttime employer formally removed her from its books, the Commission stated "[e]ven if we were to rule, as counsel now
argues, that claimant did not quit until she failed to return to
work after her baby was born, we would also rule that she was
on a maternity leave, and not eligible for benefits ... during
the duration of that leave."
Jenny's appeal to the courts proved successful. Eighteen
months after her initial, compensable separation from employment, the Jefferson County Circuit Court reversed the Commission and ordered an award of benefits. The Commission's
appeal is pending.
Eliminating agency favoritism toward employers and bureaucratic gender bias is necessary if the current anti-discrimination-based system is to protect pregnant claimants like
Jenny Brown. The first hearing officer's plain error in denying
Jenny benefits can only be explained as a result of genderbased and employer-based bias. Jenny's subsequent wrongful
disqualification for quitting part-time work, though not as
damning, further illustrates the system's inability to empathize
with pregnant workers.
II. AN EXTERNAL CRITIQUE: CHANGING THE RULES
TO ACCOMMODATE PREGNANCY

A more progressive (and better) approach is to step beyond
the anti-discrimination model and accommodate biological
differences between men and women. Current anti-discrimination laws foster disparate treatment in the workplace because
they fail to account for women's reproductive capacities. Elyse
Rosenblum and Professor Samuel lssacharoff have cogently
argued that a centr~l reason for disparate treatment of female
employees is the "birth effect,'' which forces women to interrupt
their employment.8 They conclude:
If the objective of a regulatory intervention into the
employment market is to allow women the opportunity for
career-wage profiles comparable to those of men, .... the

8.
Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy , 94 COLOM. L. REV. 2154, 2164 (1994).
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predictable mid-career interruptions caused by pregnancy
must be accommodated under a regulatory scheme aimed
at protecting the ability of women to continue their career
work force participation through the predictable periods of
fertility. 9
lssacharoff's and Rosenblum's arguments are compelling. A
systemic response to gender-based discrimination in the
workplace is needed, one that affirmatively recognizes women's
unique capacity for childbirth. As noted by Issacharoff and
Rosenblum: "The simplest model to provide for maternity
benefits is a governmental program funded through general
revenues .... [However,] [t]here is little purpose in suggesting
benefits approaches whose political viability approaches
absolute zero."1° For this reason, unemployment insurance
provides the most realistic alternative. The solution is to
amend the unemployment laws, preferably on the federal level,
to provide immediate unemployment benefits to otherwise
eligible workers who leave employment because of pregnancy.
The benefits of an insurance model are several. First and
foremost, insurance will foster gender equality in the workplace. More specifically, it will financially accommodate
pregnant women who voluntarily interrupt their careers and
are unable to privately negotiate protection. The new Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 11 is an important piece of
legislation, but it will benefit only those who can afford unpaid
leaves. Those in the lower economic strata can hardly view
unpaid leaves with optimism. Unemployment insurance also
will protect those who are involuntarily separated from the
workplace and find themselves either unprotected by antidiscrimination laws or, like Jenny, unable to enforce them. In
large measure, these are the at-risk employees who live monthto-month, week-to-week, and even day-to-day, and who need
the safety-net unemployment insurance affords.
The monetary cost of extending unemployment insurance to
pregnant workers is not necessarily minimal. Expenditures on
the insurance side, however, are likely to be offset by savings
in welfare dollars. Much is to be said for preventing mothers
on the brink of poverty from falling into the well. A more

9.
10.
11.

Id. at 2171.
Id. a t 2215.
5 U.S.C.A. §§ 6381- 6387, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601, 2611- 2619 (West Supp. 1994).
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troubling and less tangible cost is the possibility of employer
backlash against females. This can be overcome in part by not
debiting the accounts of individual employers.

